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MORE LIG H T ON TH E ABROGATION OF TH E
ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE
THE FOLLOWING article which attempts to interpret the British and Australasian attitudes toward the Anglo-Japa- nese Alliance and its modification or abrogation on the expiration date of July 13, 1921, broadens and modifies con­siderably the previously accepted view of J. Bartlet Brebner, as 
expounded in the March 1935 issue of the P olitical Science 
Q uarterly, that the Canadian prime minister, Arthur Meighen, 
led the campaign for the abrogation of the agreement, that he 
urged an international conference on Pacific affairs, and that 
thereby the Dominion of Canada formulated a policy for the 
British Empire.
Resumé of the Alliance and Its Operation to 1921
On January 30, 1902, Great Britain abandoned her splendid 
isolation and entered into an alliance with Japan. While both 
Powers pledged themselves to uphold the independence and 
territorial integrity of China and Korea and to secure equal 
opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry 
of all nations, Japan recognized the special interests of Great 
Britain in China, and Britain recognized those of Japan, political 
as well as industrial, in China and Korea. The treaty, which 
was to remain in force for at least five years,1 was directed against 
a mutual enemy—Russia. The alliance was popular in both 
nations. Japan welcomed the prestige it afforded her; the treaty 
was “a sort of ticket of admission to the great international 
game.”2 England prized the Japanese commitment as security 
against Russia—if she should threaten British interests in China 
or India—or against Germany and Russia in the event those two 
Powers should turn on France in Europe and involve Great 
Britain.3 The alliance was reframed during the Russo-Japanese
i  G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the 
Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London, 1927), voi. Il, ch. xi, final text, pp. 
115-120. Hereafter cited as British Documents.
2 Alfred L. P. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Berkeley, 1923), p. 65.
3 Taraknath Das, Foreign Policy in the Far East (New York and Toronto, 
1926), pp. 259, 261, quoting extracts from a memorandum of Sir Francis 
Bertie of the British Foreign Office, F. O. China 1501, March 11, 1901.
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peace negotiations and, as renewed for ten years, on August 12, 
1905, included India in its scope.4
At the beginning of World War I, Sir Edward Grey, hoping 
to keep Japan out of Shantung and the Pacific islands, attempted 
to limit her belligerent actions to a naval campaign against Ger­
man armed vessels in the China Seas, and to the protection of 
Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific;5 but strategic require­
ments, military necessity, and Japan’s eagerness to extend her 
field of operations to Shantung and to islands in the Pacific pro 
vented the foreign secretary from achieving his aim.6
Throughout the war Japan proved a faithful and efficient ally. 
Her navy patrolled Australian waters and the Indian Ocean. 
Great Britain’s fleet, having to guard the North Sea, the Atlantic, 
and, to a large extent, the Mediterranean, “was strained to the 
very last ship, new and old.’’ It was impossible for that fleet, 
immense as it was, to guarantee safe passage for Pacific dominion 
forces. A real test for the alliance arose. Japanese battle cruisers 
convoyed or escorted 500,000 to 600,000 ANZAC forces and 
1,000,000 Indian troops for protection against German cruisers 
still raiding the Pacific and Indian Oceans.7 By a secret Anglo- 
Japanese accord of 1915 Great Britain recognized her ally’s claim 
to the Marianas, Caroline, and Marshall Islands. At the height 
of the German submarine campaign of 1917 the British govern­
ment approached Japan for a destroyer flotilla for operations 
in the Mediterranean. Japan agreed for a price, the compensa­
tion being pledges in a secret exchange of notes by which not 
only Great Britain but France, Italy and Russia engaged them­
selves to “support Japan’s claims in regard to the disposal of 
Germany’s rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands 
north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference.” 
At the same time the British understood that the Japanese
4 For official material concerning the renewal of the alliance, see British
Documents, IV, 120-183. Text of agreement, pp. 128-113.
6 Memorandum of the British Chargé d’Affaires Barclay to the Secretary of 
State, Aug. 18, 1914, U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1914, Supplement, The World War, p. 171.
6 For Japan’s entrance into the war and her stated reasons, see Charles N. 
Spink, “Japan in the World War”, Pacific Historical Review, vol. V (Dec. 
1936), pp. 297-311.
7 Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. CXLVI. 
col. 1710, Lloyd George speaking.
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government would “treat in the same spirit Great Britain’s 
claims to the German islands south of the equator.“8
Japan emerged from the war in a position of entrenched 
hegemony in the Orient. With Germany eliminated and Russia 
demoted to a second place in the Far East, Japan took possession 
of all the former’s holdings in Shantung as well as her islands 
north of the equator, gained predominant influence in Man­
churia, and became more aggressive than either of her prede­
cessors. The destruction of Tsarist Russia left Japan supreme 
on the shores of the Sea of Japan and in the waters of the North 
Pacific. The “Island Empire of the Pacific’’ was now one of the 
world’s great Powers. British assistance was no longer needed 
for guaranteeing its integrity. Japan’s danger was from mili­
tarism at home rather than from any combination of predatory 
nations.
At the Peace Conference in Paris, Australia’s attitude toward 
Japan was a curious compound of apprehension and conciliation. 
Prime Minister William Hughes led the opposition to the Japa­
nese request for a recognition of racial equality, fearing that it 
was a veiled demand for a revision of immigration legislation. 
He disapproved of Japan’s mandate over the former German 
islands in the North Pacific, and ardently advocated Australia’s 
claims, recognition of which would have required the invalida­
tion of the 1915 and 1917 British agreements with Japan.
The political and territorial changes produced by the war 
altered the power balance and alignments. After the collapse of 
imperial Russia and Germany, Great Britain no longer needed 
help from Japan in maintaining the integrity of her empire. 
The threats to its stability were internal rather than external. 
In all the world there was but one Power—the United States— 
which could challenge Britain to combat with the remotest pos­
sibility of success. But war between these two English-speaking 
nations was unthinkable, considered outside the realm of possi­
bility. Therefore, neither Japan nor Britain needed the pro­
tection of an alliance for defensive purposes. The Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty no longer served a vital British interest, yet the agreement 
threatened amicable relations not only between the United 
Kingdom and the United States but between the mother country 
and the Dominion of Canada which was in accord with the
8 John V. A. MacMurray, comp, and ed., Treaties and Agreements with and 
Concerning China, 1894-1919 (New York, 1921), II, 1168.
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United States attitude toward Japan. Moreover, the League of 
Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of peace was 
intended to supplant alliances and secret diplomacy as means 
of ensuring security. Consequently, Britain persuaded Japan to 
make a joint statement to the League of Nations concerning the 
treaty. On July 8, 1920, Foreign Minister Curzon and the Japa­
nese Ambassador in London, Baron Chinda, signed and com­
municated to Geneva a note to the effect that their governments 
had come to “the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement 
of July 13th, 1911 . . . though in harmony with the spirit of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations,” was “not entirely consistent 
with the letter of that Covenant.” They accordingly informed 
the League that they recognized “the principle that if the said 
agreement be continued after July, 1921, it must be in a form 
not inconsistent with the Covenant.”9
Dominion Views of the Alliance
Australia, New Zealand and Canada were directly concerned 
over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The tendency 
in Australasia was to regard the treaty as a protection against 
Japanese expansion in the South Pacific; even Japan understood 
that the agreement would not stand the stress of a vigorous 
immigration policy directed toward that area. Such an attempt 
by her would threaten to drive Australia and New Zealand, and 
perhaps even Canada, away from Great Britain as a partner of 
Japan. On the other hand, neither Australia nor New Zealand 
was anxious to contribute heavily to the maintenance of a mili­
tary and naval force sufficient to protect her completely against 
a possible Japanese advance. True, a successful war by Japan 
against the United States would deal a serious blow to the safety 
of the Pacific dominions, but to antagonize Japan would be to 
expose Australasia to the revival of the immigration question 
and would thus make imperative large expenditures for the 
military and naval defense of the “White Australia” program. 
Consequently, the better policy from the point of view of these 
two dominions was, on the one hand, to support the renewal of 
the alliance in such fashion as to avoid friction with the United 
States, and, on the other hand, to prevent the race question from 
rising in an awkward or provocative way. Thus the renewed
0 Bell to Secretary of State, July 26, 1920, USDS, Foreign Relations, 1920, 
II, 685-686.
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treaty might become a sort of insurance or guarantee against war 
in the Pacific. If it were not renewed, the Pacific dominions 
would ask those responsible for its abrogation what guarantee 
could be offered as a substitute for the alliance.10
Prime Minister William Hughes of Australia favored the con­
tinuance of the alliance with such modifications as would make 
it acceptable to Great Britain, to the United States and to his 
country. After World War I, the Commonwealth, resentful of 
'‘White Australia's’" dependence on Japan, had welcomed Presi­
dent Woodrow Wilson’s naval program as a balance-of-power 
device in the Pacific. When the post-war fall in commodity prices 
nearly ruined Australia, at the same time that Britain’s economic 
distress afforded no relief from the depression and indebtedness, 
and the Singapore naval base did not materialize, Australia felt 
that she could not depend on Great Britain to win in a naval 
race in the Pacific. Only two potential allies were available, the 
United States and Japan. Remembering how the Japanese gov­
ernment had aided the empire’s cause during the war, and aware 
of the withdrawal of the United States from participation in 
plans for world security, the Pacific Commonwealth elected to 
stand by the alliance.
The reason for Australia’s action was certainly not a desire to 
assist Japanese expansion in the Pacific, but the sure knowledge 
that the treaty was her safeguard if or when Japan and the 
United States sprang at each other’s throats. Otherwise, the first 
rush of the Oriental onset, taking the Philippines and Guam in 
its stride, would fall on Australia. The United States was far 
away and American battleships, for strategic reasons, would be 
almost powerless to help at the beginning.
Hughes outlined his policy and enunciated Australia’s position 
regarding the alliance in a speech delivered in the House of 
Representatives on April 7, 1921, which contained the following:
What is the hope of the world? As I see it, it is an alliance, an 
understanding, call it what you will, between the two great branches 
of the English-speaking peoples. Now here is our dilemma. Our 
interest lies in a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Yet that 
Treaty is anathema to the Americans. We read almost every day of 
disturbing rumors of great navies, the world longing for peace re­
sounds with the clanging of hammers, nations fervently building 
more and more war ships, and there is rivalry openly expressed 
between those two great nations, the United States of America and
io Cf. Dennis, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
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Japan. America has said she must have the greatest navy in the 
world; that she must have a navy sufficiently strong to defend her­
self. To defend herself against whom? She has left the world in no 
doubt, or in very little, as to whom on this point. All these things 
concern and disturb us greatly. For we not only have no quarrel 
with America, but we have no quarrel with Japan. We have our 
ideals; Japan has hers. There is room in the world for both of us. 
We want to live on terms of amity with all the nations of the earth.
. . .  I am in favour of renewing the Treaty in any form that is 
satisfactory to Britain, America, and ourselves.11
In an interview with a Times correspondent on May 25, 1921, 
Premier William F. Massey of New Zealand said:
As to the Japanese Treaty, so long as we insist on, and maintain, 
our right to choose our fellow-citizens in this country we have much 
to gain, and nothing to lose by the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty. The Japanese were perfectly loyal to us during the war. 
When we were sending away our main body of the Expeditionary 
Force the presence of the big Japanese cruiser with the British 
cruiser made their going, as far as the sea voyage was concerned, 
perfectly safe. We owe them a debt of gratitude, and it is well to 
remember this fact, and to endeavour to repay them when oppor­
tunity offers.
The prime minister’s view was that
. . .  so far at least as New Zealand is concerned, the old dread 
of yellow immigration, though still as real and deep-seated as ever, 
is for the present rather latent than active. Though the proposed 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance raises issues of the profound- 
est possible concern to Australasia, it can not be said that the people 
of New Zealand are at all seriously exercised about it. . . . New 
Zealand has no objection whatever to the renewal of the Japanese 
treaty in its present form, nor is she in the least excited by the 
alleged endeavours of Japan to remove the bar against Asiatic immi­
gration into Australasia. And the reason is that she is fully satisfied 
that they will not succeed.12
The position of the dominion had been ably and succinctly 
stated by her high commissioner, Sir James Allen, in a single 
sentence: “New Zealand has no quarrel with or fear of Japan, 
and views the Treaty as an ample safeguard of her good faith.”13
11 Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Represenatives, vol. XCIV, 
p. 7267. Cf. ibid., vol. CXVII, p. 11635; The Times (London), Supplement, 
Empire Number, May 24, 1921.
12 The Times, May 27, 1921.
13 Ibid.
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The press of Canada generally came out against renewal, the 
outstanding exception to general disapproval of the treaty being 
the Montreal Star, an ultraconservative paper.14 British Colum­
bia, a province facing the Pacific, was inclined to favor renewal 
of the alliance if Canada specifically retained control of immi­
gration. As early as December 28, 1920, the Toronto Globe 
expressed its opposition to the treaty. An editorial of that date 
emphasized that neither Japan nor Britain needed the protec­
tion of an alliance for defensive purposes. That should be suffi­
cient reason for ending it. Under the circumstances the Globe 
believed
the interests of world-peace would be advanced by the cancellation 
of the alliance between Britain and Japan. There could be no doubt 
then as to the intention of the Britannic peoples throughout the 
world to preserve absolute neutrality in the remote but possible event 
of the friction between Japan and the United States leading eventu­
ally to hostilities. Canada assuredly—treaty or no treaty—would feel 
under no obligation to come to the help of Japan against the United 
States and so open her own borders to invasion and to all the horrors 
of modern war. The statesmen of the British Empire who are 
engaged in the work of safeguarding Britain’s interest in the Far 
East doubtless understand that Canada can be no party to any 
international agreement which involves even remotely a risk so 
great.15
The Alliance and the Conference of Prime Ministers, 1921
In June 1921, an Imperial Conference of all the prime min­
isters of the British Empire convened in London. Of the three 
principal topics discussed therein—foreign policy, imperial de­
fense, and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty—the commitments under 
the alliance were considered the most pressing by Canada, Aus­
tralia and New Zealand. The ministers were concerned with 
evolving a policy of peace for the Pacific. The discussion of 
tranquillity and security in that ocean centered on the alliance 
and a limitation of naval armaments in the area. The conference 
had been forewarned that the treaty would come to an end on 
July 13, 1921, on the ground that the Anglo-Japanese memo­
randum of July 8, 1920, addressed to the League of Nations,
14 J. Bartlet Brebner, “Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Wash­
ington Conference", Political Science Quarterly, vol. L (March 1935), 
pp. 49-50.
is Toronto Globe, Dec. 28, 1920.
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concerning the alliance’s incompatibility with the League Cove­
nant amounted to a denunciation. The three months’ extension 
requested by the British government was intended to afford the 
conference an opportunity of considering the question of re­
newal; but the assumption on June 20, the first day of the 
conference, was that in three weeks the alliance would expire if 
the prime ministers did not arrange for its renewal.16
The notification was regarded by British legal experts as con­
stituting a denunciation of the treaty as provided in clause 6, 
which stipulated that twelve months’ notice should be given for 
termination. The question before the conference when it turned 
to the discussion of the treaty was whether it should be renewed 
in a form consistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations 
or be allowed to lapse.
In his opening speech before the conference, Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George referred briefly “to one of the most urgent 
and important of foreign questions—the relations of the Empire 
with the United States and Japan,” and asserted:
there is no quarter of the world where we desire more greatly to 
maintain peace and fair play for all nations and to avoid a competi­
tion of armaments than in the Pacific and in the Far East. Our 
Alliance with Japan has been a valuable factor in that direction in 
the past. We have found Japan a faithful Ally, who rendered us 
valuable assistance in an hour of serious and very critical need. . . . 
We desire to preserve that well-tried friendship which has stood us 
both in good stead, and to apply it to the solution of all questions 
in the Far East, where Japan has special interests, and where we 
ourselves, like the United States, desire equal opportunities and the 
open door.17
The British cabinet, including Foreign Secretary Curzon, Colo­
nial Secretary Winston Churchill, and Arthur J. Balfour, repre­
sentative for League of Nations Affairs, publicly favored renewal 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
In the second meeting of the conference, June 21, Prime 
Minister Hughes delivered his first speech, in which he took 
occasion to set forth the attitude of Australia toward the Anglo-
16 Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. XCVII, 
p. 11635. Cf. The Times, July 26, 1921, p. 10.
ir Great Britain, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1921, vol. XIV, Cmd. 
1474, Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United 
Kingdom, the Dominions and India held in June, July and August, 1921, 
p. 13. Hereafter cited as Conference of Prime Ministers.
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Japanese Alliance. He pointed out, ‘‘we have not a clean slate 
before us. If we had to consider for the first time whether we 
should have a treaty with Japan, the position might be very 
different. We have not.” The treaty, though modified, had been 
in existence for many years. It could not be renewed precisely 
in its present form, for it must conform to the requirements of 
the League of Nations. ‘‘But the case for renewal is very strong, 
if not indeed overwhelming. To Australia . . . this treaty with 
Japan has special significance.” Hughes continued:
Speaking broadly, we are in favour of its renewal. But there are 
certain difficulties which must be faced. One of these arises out of 
the attitude of America towards this Treaty. I am sure I state the 
opinion of Australia when I say the people have a very warm comer 
in their hearts for America. They see in America today what they 
themselves hope to be in the future. We have a country very similar 
in extent and resources, and it may be laid down as a sine qua non 
that any future Treaty with Japan, to be satisfactory to Australia, 
must specifically exclude the possibility of a war with the United 
States of America. It ought to do this specifically, but if not spe­
cifically then by implication so clear and unmistakable that he who 
runs may read. It is perfectly true that the present Treaty does this 
by implication, but not so plainly as to preclude misinterpretation. 
In any future Treaty we must guard against even the suspicion of 
hostility or unfriendliness to the United States.18
The Australian prime minister suggested a conference to in­
clude the United States and Japan.19 He indicated that disarma­
ment was related to the renewal or nonrenewal of the Anglo- 
Japanese Treaty, but stated,
in any case we must have such naval defense as is necessary for our 
security. The War and the Panama Canal have shifted the world’s 
stage from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to the Pacific. The 
stage upon which the great world drama is to be played in the 
future is in the Pacific. The American Navy is now in those waters. 
Peace in the Pacific means peace for this Empire and for the world.20
William Massey considered the Anglo-Japanese Treaty as one 
of the most important subjects on the agenda of the conference. 
With whatever modifications might be necessary, he was quite 
prepared to support its renewal. In saying this he was guided by 
Japan’s cooperation during the war, when the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans were not safe, and at a time when there were twenty-eight
is Ibid., p. 19.
is Ibid., p. 20.
20 Ibid., p. 21.
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or more Australian and New Zealand ships in the latter ocean 
carrying twenty-eight thousand troops. Massey observed:
But supposing Japan had been on the enemy side, one result 
would have been quite certain, that neither Australia nor New 
Zealand would have been able to send troops to the front, neither 
could we have sent food or equipment—equipment for the soldiers 
and sailors or food for the civil population of Britain. It would not 
have been possible. These things have all to be remembered in 
connexion with the renewal of the Treaty. I am prepared to take 
the American view into consideration. I do not want to leave any 
wrong impression on that point.21
The prime minister, however, made clear that his support of 
the Anglo-Japanese Treaty did “not in the very slightest affect 
the fact that in New Zealand we stand by our right to choose our 
future fellow-citizens/’22
Thus Massey’s views were similar to those of Hughes, his alter 
ego, with whom he generally agreed. But behind the scenes 
before the conference convened, Sir John Findlay, a distinguished 
New Zealander who, with Sir John Ward, had represented the 
dominion at the Imperial Conference of 1911 and had again 
returned to London on February 6, 1921, took a radically differ­
ent position. The visitor had made a special study of the prob­
lems of imperial policy in the Pacific Ocean and was experienced 
in framing the legislation of the young country. During the 
premiership of Richard Seddon there was scarcely an important 
act placed on the statute books which was not drafted by Findlay, 
who, though not a member of the government, was treated by 
Mr. Seddon as an unofficial counselor. After the premier’s death, 
Sir John was not only appointed attorney general and minister 
of justice, but was also made leader of the Legislative Council, 
or upper chamber of the New Zealand legislature. According to 
the Times:
Whether in or out of office, Sir John Findlay, the leading K. C. 
in the Dominion, has been the deus ex machina whose intervention 
has often turned the course of events into new channels, sometimes 
with far reaching consequences not oidy for New Zealand, but for the 
Empire. He it was, for instance, who inspired the dramatic offer 
of a Dreadnought from the Dominion to the Imperial Government 
in 1912, at the time of the trouble with Germany over the Agadir 
incident in Morocco.23
2i Ibid., p. 31.
23 The Times, Feb. 7, 1921.
22 Ibid.
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Findlay remained true to form in London. In an article of 
February 10, 1921, which was in reality an interview, he was 
reported to have asserted that
New Zealand and Australia, while appreciating Japan’s assistance 
in the war, have resolved to remain white men’s countries. They 
had prepared plans for a big scheme, firstly of Imperial, and secondly 
of European immigration, barring Germans and Russians. The 
scheme will presently be launched. They object emphatically to a 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, which is unjustified, since 
the German and Russian menaces have been removed, and America 
is ready to make common cause in the event of a Japanese peril. 
The question must be properly thrashed out at the coming Imperial 
Conference.24
Thus William Massey and Sir John Findlay were in open 
disagreement over the alliance before the conference assembled. 
The premier in his May 26 interview stated that neither the 
original nor the amended statements made by Findlay on Febru­
ary 10 and 24 on the subject of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty “really 
fit the facts.“25
According to an article in the October 6, 1921 issue of the 
Daily Express,26 Findlay came to London to acquaint the British 
government with the position of the New Zealand people. The 
attorney general informed the writer of the article that just prior 
to the Imperial Conference “the feeling in New Zealand was so 
strong against the Anglo-Japanese treaty that unless England 
showed herself as determined to resist all Japanese demands, the 
people of New Zealand were in favor of separating themselves 
from the British Empire and asking the United States to assume 
a protectorate.” He added: “This will not be printed in the 
British newspapers and it will not be liked by the British gov­
ernment, but that is the way we feel.”27
However, the prime ministers of Australia and Canada respec-
24 Wellington Evening Post, Feb. 25, 1921.
25 The Times, May 27, 1921.
26 The Daily Express, London, owing to Lord Beaverbrook’s close personal 
relations with Lloyd George, might be credited with having access to some 
authentic information on important political proceedings.
27 Enclosure in confidential letter of N. C. Twining, naval attaché to the 
American Embassy in London, to the Secretary of the Navy, Oct. 12, 1921, 
Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, RG 45, 
Office of Naval Intelligence File, Register no. 14865-A, Subject File 1911-1927, 
OY Limitation of Armament Conference, declassified Feb. 1948, Navy Dept., 
Archives of the United States. Hereafter cited as Naval Intelligence File.
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tively led the fight in the conference for and against the retention 
of the alliance. On June 29 the Canadian minister expressed 
his government’s opposition to the renewal of the treaty in any 
form on the grounds that the reason for its existence had expired, 
that such entanglements were incompatible with the League of 
Nations’ principles, and that both the United States and China 
regarded the alliance with mistrust as implying benevolent neu­
trality toward Japanese aggression. The preceding February 
Arthur Meighen had urged Lloyd George to invite the United 
States, Japan, China, and the empire to a conference on Pacific 
affairs to settle outstanding issues. Canada feared her own in­
volvement in an American-Japanese conflict which was contrary 
to the basic principle of her foreign policy—maintenance of the 
best possible relations between Great Britain and the United 
States. Therefore Meighen resisted the renewal of the alliance 
for he feared it threatened amicable Anglo-American and Cana- 
dian-American relations, upon both of which Canada depended 
for her security. He reminded the delegates that good Anglo- 
American relations were the cornerstone of British policy and 
the hope of the world.28 The Canadian people half-consciously 
shared their minister’s feelings, and a majority of the press be­
lieved he expressed the opinion of his countrymen.29
William Hughes’s retort to Meighen that “The British Empire 
must have a reliable friend in the Pacific” set off a series of sharp 
exchanges. Lloyd George sensing the fervor of the two ministers 
and their unyielding positions calmed the tense atmosphere by 
declaring that the July 8, 1920 joint Anglo-Japanese note to the 
League of Nations did not constitute a valid denunciation of the 
treaty, which, therefore, would continue in force until it was 
really denounced. This was the prediction that had been made
28 Brebner, loc. cit., pp. 53-54.
29 Cf. The Times, May 24, 1921, Supplement, Empire Number, p. vi, 
“Canada and the U. S. A.—Ideals in Common”. New York Times, Nov. 9, 
1921, p. 13, Nov. 11, p. 12. However, in a letter to the editor of the New 
York Times, signed “Canuck”, Trochu, Alberta, Dec. 8, 1921, the view was 
expressed that Meighen did not speak for Canada nor have a mandate from 
the Canadian people to act on their behalf, that he not only played to the 
gallery and to the United States in denouncing the treaty, but also created 
a false impression abroad to the effect that the dominions were so slightly 
joined to the mother country that anything advocated by them which ran 
counter to England’s wishes would result in their breaking away altogether 
and setting themselves up as independent states on the idea of self-deter­
mination of small nations. New York Times, Dec. 25, 1921, VII, 10:5.
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over a year earlier by the Peking and Tientsin Times which had 
carried on a consistent campaign against the continuance of the 
alliance and had declared that the treaty would not be renewed 
in July 1921, but that a laissez faire policy would be adopted.30
By July 1 the Canadian minister had convinced Jan Smuts, 
Curzon and Lloyd George of the importance of taking a chance 
on American willingness to collaborate on a Pacific agreement. 
The Marquess Curzon then surprised the conference by outlining 
a procedure for a Pacific conference which would include the 
United States as a party to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as pro­
posed by Arthur Meighen. This action, according to J. Bartlet 
Brebner, represented the first notable occasion of a British 
dominion formulating a policy of the empire.31
The proposal was now put to the test. Tokyo was noncom­
mittal;32 Washington expressed disapproval of the treaty's re­
newal but interest in an agreement on Pacific affairs. As early 
as August 1914 the United States had discreetly sounded the 
attitude of the belligerents upon the question of maintenance of 
the status quo in the Far East and throughout the Pacific gen­
erally. Great Britain then found such a suggestion impractical 
for she had already launched operations against Germany in the 
Pacific.33 Historically, the United States took no exception to 
the alliance and only after the World War was it seriously re­
garded in Washington as constituting a potential danger to the 
country. The United States government, however, made no 
authoritative declaration in regard to the treaty. American dis­
trust of the alliance centered on its relation to Japanese im­
perialism on the continent of Asia rather than on the possibility 
that it might involve England in a war with the United States. 
The State Department looked upon the treaty as a political 
instrument harmful to its policies in Eastern Asia.34
so Peking and Tientsin Times, June 24, 1920; Dennis, op. cit., p. 73.
si Brebner, loc. cit., p. 56.
32 For Japanese opinion toward the renewal of the alliance, see Dennis, 
op. cit., pp. 64-68, 91-93; A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of 
the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 278, 288, 298; The Times, July 26, 
1921, p. 10, “The Pacific—Plain Words from Japan”, and Aug. 16, p. 8, 
“Japan Doubts—Public Dislike of Conference”.
33 USDS, Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement, pp. 162, 165-166.
si For the attitude of the United States toward the treaty and its renewal, 
see Griswold, op. cit., pp. 275 et seq., and The Times, Sept. 16, 1921, p. 8.
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During the course of the Imperial Conference, on July 21, Mr. 
Hughes addressed the American Luncheon Club, and among 
other things said that “unless, and until, the Pacific problem is 
settled, it is obvious that the prospect of the great naval powers 
coming to an agreement on a practicable scheme is remote.” 
Therefore, he advocated a preliminary conference or meeting to 
discuss Pacific questions at which Australia and New Zealand 
should be represented.35
The prime ministers at London neither renewed nor abrogated 
the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but the proposal to hold a Pacific 
conference received their unanimous support and was considered 
at great length. On July 11, Lord Curzon suggested that a pre­
liminary meeting on Pacific and Far Eastern affairs be held in 
London during the first part of August. The American Secretary 
of State, Charles Evans Hughes, objected because China, Japan 
and the United States could not make suitable preparations by 
that time, and he felt that postponement of the conference on 
the limitation of armaments would create an unfavorable Ameri­
can public reaction.36 The Conference of Prime Ministers closed 
on August 5 and six days later President Warren G. Harding 
issued formal invitations to the Conference on the Limitation of 
Armament and Far Eastern Affairs to convene at Washington on 
November 1, 1921. Secretary Hughes remained adamant on the 
question of a preliminary meeting—even one at Bar Harbor, 
Maine—to prepare the agenda on Pacific and Far Eastern affairs, 
not because he was unwilling to consult with the dominion pre­
miers, but because in his solicitude for the success of the confer­
ence he did not wish to have freedom of discussion limited by 
any preliminary deliberations on the part of a particular group.37
Prime Minister Hughes, after returning home, reviewed Aus­
tralia’s position before and at the Conference of Prime Ministers 
in a lengthy speech delivered to the House of Representatives on 
September 30. He warned: “If we cannot secure a satisfactory 
Treaty, then it is obvious that any adequate scheme of naval 
defence will involve us in much greater expenditure, and at a
35 Australia, Parliamentary Debates, vol. XCVII, p. 11639.
36 Secretary Hughes to Ambassador Harvey, July 13, 1921, USDS, Foreign 
Relations, 1921, I, 28-29.
37 Harvey to Hughes, July 27, 1921, in ibid., pp. 46-47; Merze Tate, The 
United States and Armaments (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), p. 125. See pp. 
122-126 on the genesis of the Washington Conference.
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time when our resources are strained to the uttermost/’38 The 
prime minister was for an immediate declaration of intention to 
renew the alliance upon terms that would at once be compatible 
with the League of Nations Covenant, which would give the 
United States ample opportunity to be consulted officially, and 
which would “exclude specifically, and in set terms, the possi­
bility of our being ranged in hostile array against America by 
virtue of that Treaty.” That was his position, and he ventured 
“to say that a further postponement will, and can, place us in 
no better position than we are today.”39
Meanwhile, on August 18, Lloyd George reported to the House 
of Commons on the Conference of Prime Ministers. Referring 
to the Japanese treaty he said: “The Alliance is an existing 
Alliance, and until 12 months’ notice is given that Alliance con­
tinues.” He reviewed the operation of the agreement during the 
war and asserted that no man could “come to any other con­
clusion than that it was loyally and faithfully interpreted and 
carried out by our Japanese Allies.”40 Then he asked:
Is it to be suggested that we should now turn round and say to 
them, “You stood by us in trouble, but we do not need you any 
longer, so goodbye”? Would anyone behave like that in business? 
The British Empire must behave like a gentleman, and when you 
come to deal with a country that has stood by you in trouble—stood 
well by you—are you to bring the alliance to an end when the 
trouble is over? I say that would not be becoming of the British 
Empire in dealing with a faithful Ally. And let me say this: I do 
not believe there is any country in the world, whether it likes the 
Japanese Alliance or does not like it, that would think any better of 
the British Empire if we broke off the alliance—not one. They 
might appear to be glad at the moment that we had done it, but 
in their hearts they would despise us for doing it.41
Instead of abrogating the alliance, the prime minister sug­
gested a new combination of Britain, Japan and the United 
States, emphasizing particularly that the “cardinal principle of 
British policy” must be to “act in as complete accord with the 
United States of America as any two countries can.” The idea 
of such a triple entente was not novel, for it had come up in the 
discussions in the Imperial Conference and had been voiced in
38 Australia, Parliamentary Debates, vol. XCVII, p. 11635.
39 Ibid., p. 11636.
40 Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. CXLVI, 
col. 1710.
41 Ibid., col. 1711.
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the British press and in the House of Commons. In reporting 
Lloyd George’s speech, the Times concluded: “If the Alliance 
with Japan could merge in a greater understanding with Japan 
and the United States of America in all the problems of the 
Pacific that would be a great event which would be a gallant 
deed for the peace of the world.”42
Between London and Washington
During the summer and early autumn of 1921 there was a 
noticeable change of attitude in the United Kingdom toward the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. A year earlier, in the summer of 1920, 
when the Peking and Tientsin Times was predicting nonrenewal 
of the agreement,48 the (London) Times correspondent in Tokyo 
was reporting that it was taken for granted that the alliance 
would be renewed.44 Throughout the winter of 1920-1921 there 
was comparatively little in the British press regarding the sub­
ject. This was not the case, however, by the following autumn. 
Rear Admiral Nathan C. Twining,45 naval attaché to the Ameri­
can Embassy in London, reported that the history of the psy­
chology of the situation in regard to the alliance was remarkable. 
When the treaty first came up for renewal “the whole atmosphere 
was apparently calm and clear, no tangible opposition appeared, 
and it seemed to be taken as a matter of course, in default of any 
better way out, that the Anglo-Japanese treaty would be renewed, 
with the understanding that it did not apply in case of trouble 
between the United States and Japan.”46
During the Conference of Prime Ministers the British govern­
ment had heard strong and plain language from the representa­
tives of Canada and New Zealand. In the meantime sentiment 
had developed in the United States, and the press generally 
expressed the opinion, that renewal of the Anglo-Japanese pact 
would be considered a distinctly unfriendly act toward the 
United States. Press extracts conveying this idea were taken
42 The Times, Aug. 19, 1921.
42 Peking and Tientsin Times, June 24, 1920.
44 Dennis, op. cit., p. 73.
45 Rear Admiral Nathan Crook Twining, Jr., served as Chief of Staff to 
Admiral William S. Sims during World War I. He was the uncle of General 
Nathan Farragut Twining, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force in 
the first Eisenhower administration and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff in the second.
46 Twining to Secretary of the Navy, Oct. 12, 1921, Naval Intelligence File.
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from the American papers and printed throughout the United 
Kingdom.
Moreover, three distinguished Britishers came out publicly in 
favor of revision, enlargement, or abrogation of the agreement. 
As a result of the conference of premiers David Lloyd George 
openly and earnestly proposed an Anglo-American-Japanese 
triple alliance.47 Although he felt that the arguments in favor 
of renewal were stronger than those in favor of denouncing the 
alliance, he hoped that the true line of advance lay “not in de­
nouncing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but in transforming it 
into a Pacific triple entente, which the combined liberal forces 
of Great Britain and America could effectually prevent from ever 
becoming aggressive or acquisitive.”48
Lord Northcliffe,49 returning from the antipodes where he had 
urged dominion participation in the Washington Conference, 
declared in an October 25 interview with a Reuters correspond­
ent in Hong Kong his opposition to the treaty. He gave as his 
reason that it placed the United States “outside of the very 
definite arrangements for the control of China.” For two years 
he had been gradually coming to the conclusion that the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance had outrun its usefulness. “Japan faithfully 
carried out the compact during the war, and she had been well 
rewarded for her services.” The purpose of the Washington Con­
ference was to reach a mutual agreement, but the United States 
was handicapped by an existing arrangement between Japan and 
Great Britain concerning the chief problem of the Pacific. North­
cliffe concluded: “A prolongation of the alliance only serves to 
irritate public and official opinion in the United States, merely 
humiliates China and adds nothing to the prestige of Great 
Britain in Asia.”50
Viscount Bryce, who had just returned from a visit to the 
United States, contributed to the Times of October 18 an article
47 New York Times, Oct. 14, 1921.
48 Ibid., Oct. 2, 1921, VIII, 4. This opinion was expressed to Professor 
C. H. Van Tyne, of the History Department of the University of Michigan, 
in a letter written “by a man of international reputation, who now occupies 
one of the most important positions in the British Empire.”
49 Alfred Charles William Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Northcliffe, was a 
newspaper proprietor who served as chairman of the British War Mission, 
1917-1918, director of propaganda in enemy countries, 1918, and of the Civil 
Aerial Transport Committee in 1917.
^ N ew  York Times, Oct. 27, 1921.
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on the Washington Conference in which he referred to the 
American attitude toward the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in these 
words:
It has been pointed out over and over again that there is nothing 
in that treaty to affect the United States. Nevertheless, nine men 
out of ten in the United States continue to repeat that England is 
the ally—the exclusive ally—of Japan, and that the effect of the 
treaty has been and is to make Japan think she has a comparatively 
free hand and may adopt policies of aggression on which she would 
otherwise fear to embark.51
Lord Bryce observed that no explanation seemed likely to 
remove this impression from the American mind. It remained 
even when Englishmen pointed out that their own interests in 
securing not only the open door for commerce in China but the 
political independence of China were exactly the same as the 
interests of the United States. He concluded that there was no 
reason whatever for any divergence between the British and 
American policy as regards China and the possible action of 
Japan there.
Admiral Twining reported that by October the whole situation 
so far as the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was concerned had changed 
“from one of obvious, inevitable and peaceful procedure leading 
to the renewal of that treaty” to one in which the British govern­
ment was faced with a tremendous problem which affected “the 
internal arrangements of the British Empire and its most impor­
tant relations with the United States.” There was a desire in the 
United Kingdom that the government should escape in some way 
from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The general impression there 
was that the United States and Japan would be at war before 
many years, and the disturbing question was the position Britain 
would occupy in case of such an event. There was no question 
as to the sympathy of the English people; “in case of a white 
race against a yellow race the English would side with the white 
race” and the universal desire of Englishmen and the most press­
ing need of England was for “close and most friendly relations 
with the United States.”52
From conversations with various people in minor government 
positions and in the army and navy, Twining received the clear
si The Times, Oct. 18, 1921.
52 Twining to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Nov. 19, 29, 1921, Naval 
Intelligence File.
550 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. LXXIV
impression that a termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
would be distinctly welcome, provided it could be reached with­
out any actual or apparent bad faith toward the Japanese. Indi­
viduals freely expressed the opinion in private that they disliked 
the Japanese and regretted that political necessity had brought 
Great Britain into alliance with Japan.
From newspaper articles and from conversations which Twin­
ing had with people not in official life, there was also evidence 
of a strong sentiment in the country against the continuation of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; but in November, after the Wash­
ington Conference assembled, British opinion was not entirely 
certain whether the abrogation of the alliance would be favored 
in case of failure of the conference to produce some agreement 
or understanding which would in effect accomplish the same 
purpose as was supposed to be accomplished by the alliance. 
There seemed to be a very general opinion in Great Britain that 
the existence of this alliance was a source of irritation to the 
United States, and that its abrogation would tend to strengthen 
the Anglo-American entente, which was almost universally de­
sired.53
In addition to the anxiety over the treaty as a political instru­
ment distasteful to the United States, and the feeling that the 
agreement had served its purpose, there was dissatisfaction with 
the alliance among British mercantile and financial interests 
alarmed over the increasing competition of Japanese commerce 
in China. They were also concerned that their business relations 
with the Chinese might suffer because of Britain’s apparent ap­
proval of her ally’s methods. Significant articles by prominent 
Englishmen in the Far East voiced these anxieties.54 For instance, 
Robert Young, editor of the Japan Chronicle, considered that the 
alliance had “failed to preserve the independence of Korea or 
strengthen the integrity of China.’’ It had “aroused the deepest 
resentment in China and intense suspicion in America.” It was 
the cause of much of the ill-feeling that prevailed between China 
and Japan. Young concluded:
The militarists of Japan and of Britain, supported by their respec­
tive Foreign Offices, favour the Alliance, for it carries out the 
unexpressed objects for which it was really framed. But the agree­
ment is wholly against the real interests of the British and Japanese
53 Same to same, Nov. 29, 1921, in ibid.
54 Dennis, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
No. 4] ABROGATION OF ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 551
peoples, which consist in the establishment of good relations and 
friendship with all nations.55
Even in Japan there appeared to be an unofficial volte face on 
the question of the renewal of the treaty. The correspondent of 
the United Press in Tokyo reported that by November the edi­
torials and semiofficial comment in the newspapers had suddenly 
turned against a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The 
substitution of an American, British and Japanese understanding 
was being urged as highly desirable.56
The Washington Conference
In Washington the spokesmen of the Pacific dominions, while 
claiming to favor the renewal of the alliance, were less deter­
mined in their support of it than had been Prime Ministers 
Hughes and Massey in London. Now there appeared a willing­
ness on the part of the delegates of both countries to search for 
a satisfactory tripartite agreement as a substitute for the bilateral 
alliance. In a press conference of November 22 Senator George 
Foster Pearce57 made clear that even though Australia had 
nothing to do with the initiation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
and the war peril had passed which led her to endorse the treaty 
in the council of the empire, held in London in 1911, his govern­
ment was in full accord with the rest of the British Empire with 
regard to the treaty. He gave a lucid explanation of the circum­
stances surrounding the Labour party’s attitude on the subject 
of the renewal in 1911, when the party believed that, in the 
interest of Australia, the treaty should be renewed. The war 
demonstrated that Japan was an honorable ally who faithfully 
fulfilled her obligations under the treaty, and “it would not be 
fair treatment for us to be the first to say that the treaty shall 
now go into the waste basket.’’ He wanted, however, to see the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance renewed in such a form that was com­
pletely acceptable to and in no way directed against the United 
States. He also stated that the American proposal for a limita-
cs Robert Young, “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance”, Contemporary Review, 
vol. CXX (July 1921), p. 19.
Sydney Morning Herald, Nov. 21, 1921.
57 In the conference documents Pearce is officially designated as “Minister 
of Defence”, but in the Times (London), the New York Times, the Sydney 
Morning Herald, and the Wellington Evening Post he is always referred to 
as Senator Pearce.
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tion of naval armaments, “which was hailed with lively enthusi­
asm by the people of the Australian Commonwealth, had mate­
rially strengthened the sentiment there in favor of a ‘triple 
entente’ in the Far East.’’58
New Zealand stood beside Australia in favoring the continu­
ance of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty at least until “a more com­
prehensive system’’ for guaranteeing the peace of the Far East 
had been devised. Her spokesman, Sir John William Salmond, 
was reported as saying:
We see no justification for scrapping that alliance without substi­
tuting something for it. Japan gave us faithful and valuable service 
in the dangerous time of war and we owe her our gratitude for it. 
It is not the English nor the American way to turn our backs on a 
friend. If and when some more general agreement can be entered 
into for the preservation of the peace of the Pacific, New Zealand 
and Australia will welcome it as a substitute for the present imper­
fect system.59
In fine, by the time the Washington Conference convened, the 
opinion of all the dominion representatives appears to have been 
that expressed by General Jan Smuts in the Conference of Prime 
Ministers when he stated that South Africa was “opposed to any 
exclusive alliances.’’ To him it seemed “clear that the only path 
of safety for the British Empire is a path on which she can walk 
together with America.’’60 Moreover, the New Zealand delegate 
insisted that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not applicable 
against the United States, stating that a recent speech of Lloyd 
George in the House of Commons expressed sufficiently New 
Zealand’s point of view.61
At the Washington Conference the most dramatic achievement 
was the Five-Power Treaty to limit quantitatively and qualita­
tively capital ship and aircraft carrier construction at a ratio of 
5-5-3-1.67-1.62 Japan accepted a position of capital ship inferi­
ority in accordance with the 5-5-3 ratio only on condition that 
Great Britain and the United States agree not to build new forti­
fications in the Pacific during the life of the treaty. Consequently,
ss New York Times, Nov. 23, 1921; Sydney Morning Herald, Nov. 24, 1921. 
59 New York Times, Nov. 24, 1921.
G° Conference of Prime Ministers, p. 24. 
ci Ibid.
62 U.S. Senate Documents, 67 Cong., 2 Sess., no. 126, Conference on the 
lÀmitation of Armament, pp. 252-254, 875-876.
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there was incorporated in this treaty Article XIX, an agreement 
to maintain the sta tus quo  of certain specified naval bases and 
fortifications in the Pacific.63 This article aimed to make the 
Pacific truly pacific.
With the menace of attack by one of the Pacific naval Powers 
against another removed, the way was prepared for the abroga­
tion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The representatives of the 
British Empire, Japan, the United States and France entered 
into a Four-Power Treaty on December 13, 1921, under the terms 
of which the signatories agreed that if there should develop be­
tween any of them a controversy arising out of ‘‘any Pacific 
question and involving their said rights” which was not satis­
factorily settled by diplomacy and was likely to affect their 
harmonious accord, they would refer the whole subject to a 
joint conference of all the high contracting parties “for consid­
eration and adjustment.” If the said rights were threatened by 
any other Power, the contracting parties agreed to communicate 
with one another “in order to arrive at an understanding as to 
the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to 
meet the exigencies of the particular situation.”64 The agreement 
of ten years’ duration was limited in its application to “insular 
possessions and Dominions in the Pacific Ocean,” including the 
mandated islands.
This was a four- not a three-Power treaty as originally advo­
cated. Secretary Hughes insisted upon bringing France into the 
agreement, not only to soothe her somewhat ruffled pride over 
the naval ratio of 1.67 vis-à-vis the same for Italy, but undoubt­
edly as a deliberate policy of generalizing the responsibilities of 
a treaty that might otherwise appear to be a departure from the 
traditional American policy of avoiding entangling alliances. 
The agreement called merely for consultation, not arbitration, 
and even this was limited by a supplementary proviso so as not 
“to embrace questions which according to principles of interna­
tional law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
respective Powers.”65
This mild denatured agreement to refer disputes to consulta­
tion met American objections to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
63 Ibid., p. 875.
64 ibid., pp. 102-103, 890.
65 Ibid., p. 892. For a discussion of the Four-Power Treaty, see Tate, op. 
rit . np. 126-133.
554 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [V ol. LXXIV
and was a cheap price for the United States to pay for the abro­
gation of that alliance and a new pledge of respect for the integ­
rity of the Philippines. In the words of A. Whitney Griswold: 
“It substituted a four-power agreement to talk for a two-power 
agreement to fight.“66
The delegates of both Australia and New Zealand were satis­
fied, in fact pleased, with the results of the conference. From 
Senator Pearce’s point of view the Four-Power Treaty was the 
most valuable of the agreements concluded at Washington. Sir 
John Salmond felt that the quadruple agreement ensured peace 
in the Pacific Ocean for at least ten years. Pearce, in a statement 
to the Australian Press Association on February 6, 1922, ob­
served: “The Four-Power Pacific pact does not involve any
interference in purely domestic questions, therefore it does not 
in any way involve our independence in respect to local ques­
tions.“ Referring to the remarkable results achieved at Wash­
ington, the statesman concluded that “the success of the Con­
ference is beyond the wildest anticipation of the most hopeful,“ 
and he invited critics in Australia who foretold its failure to 
review their criticism.67
At the Washington Conference a Japanese diplomatist is 
alleged to have remarked to his British colleague: “At any rate 
you gave the Alliance a splendid funeral!“ and the Englishman 
is not reported to have disagreed.68
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